All-in-one free web application security tool. Web application vulnerability and privacy scanner with support for HTTP cookies, Flash, HTML5 localStorage, sessionStorage, CANVAS, Supercookies, Evercookies. Includes a free SSL/TLS, HTML and HTTP vulnerability scanner and URL malware scanner.
Category: Social Network
Keywords: instagram
Last fetched: 2019-12-09T20:29:50.960859+00:00
HTTP status: 5 Sub-resource URL
Location: https://www.instagram.com/p/B5urbnqjppU/media/?size=t
The HTTP Location header is being returned by a server to redirect the web browser to a new URL of the requested resource. The URL may be relative (/index.html
) or absolute (https://example.com
).
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is an opt-in security enhancement that is specified by a web application through the use of a special response header.
Read more...
HTTP Strict Transport Security is enabled
+2X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Instructs the browser if the current website can be embedded in HTML frame by another website. Since this allows the parent website to control the framed page, this creates a potential for data theft attacks ("clickjacking") and most sensitive websites won't allow them to be framed at all (deny
) or just allow parts of them to be embedded in frames created by themselves only (samesite
).
Clickjacking protection is enabled
+2X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
A non-standard but widely accepted header introduced originally by Microsoft to disable "content sniffing" or heuristic content type discovery in absence or mismatch of a proper HTTP Content-Type
declaration, which led to a number of web attacks. In general, presence of the header with its only defined value of nosniff
is considered as part of a properly secured HTTP response.
Fuzzy content type guessing is disabled
+1X-XSS-Protection: 0
Controls an Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) filters built into the majority of web browsers. The filter is usually turned on by default anyway, but requirement to set the header to 1
became part of canonical set of "secure" HTTP headers. Over time, vulnerabilities in the "sanitizing" mode filter were found, so 1; mode=block
became the recommended value. Some companies decided that they don't really need a browser-side XSS filter to mess with their web services which are XSS-free anyway and they became consciously disabling the XSS filter by setting the header to 0
.
XSS auditor is disabled
0Transport Layer Security (TLS) is enabled
+2report-uri https://www.instagram.com/security/csp_report/; default-src 'self' https://www.instagram.com; img-src https: data: blob:; font-src https: data:; media-src 'self' blob: https://www.instagram.com https://*.cdninstagram.com https://*.fbcdn.net; manifest-src 'self' https://www.instagram.com; script-src 'self' https://instagram.com https://www.instagram.com https://*.www.instagram.com https://*.cdninstagram.com wss://www.instagram.com https://*.facebook.com https://*.fbcdn.net https://*.facebook.net 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' blob:; style-src 'self' https://*.www.instagram.com https://www.instagram.com 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self' https://instagram.com https://www.instagram.com https://*.www.instagram.com https://graph.instagram.com https://*.graph.instagram.com https://*.cdninstagram.com https://api.instagram.com wss://www.instagram.com wss://edge-chat.instagram.com https://*.facebook.com https://*.fbcdn.net https://*.facebook.net chrome-extension://boadgeojelhgndaghljhdicfkmllpafd blob:; worker-src 'self' blob: https://www.instagram.com; frame-src 'self' https://instagram.com https://www.instagram.com https://staticxx.facebook.com https://www.facebook.com https://web.facebook.com https://connect.facebook.net https://m.facebook.com; object-src 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests
Content-Security-Policy
No base-uri
allows attackers to inject base
tags which override the base URI to an attacker-controlled origin. Set to 'none'
unless you need to handle tricky relative URLs scheme
You should definitely try using 'strict-dynamic'
to eliminate those long lists of trusted third-party scripts
Consider using script-src 'report-sample'
as it significantly helps debugging CSP reports. See specification
Origin script-src 'unsafe-inline'
allows bypassing of CSP and execution of inlined untrusted scripts. Use 'nonce-'
or 'sha256-'
instead
Origin script-src 'unsafe-eval'
allows bypassing of CSP and execution of inlined untrusted scripts. Use 'nonce-'
or 'sha256-'
instead
Origin style-src 'unsafe-inline'
allows bypassing of CSP and execution of inlined untrusted scripts. Use 'nonce-'
or 'sha256-'
instead
Want second opinion? Try Google CSP Evaluator.